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It is useful to examine government regula-
tion from the viewpoint of the American 
consumer. Like anyone who has ever 
breathed dirty air or smelled contaminated 
water, I am concerned about what our busi-
ness sector does to society. Of course, I am 
equally concerned about pollution by 
government and consumers, which often 
can be as bad if not worse. But as a pur-
chaser of goods and services, I also care a 
great deal about what business firms do for 
us as consumers. What is the central role of 
the business system? Surely, it is to satisfy 
consumer demands and to create jobs and 
income by producing and selling goods and 
services. 
I find it fascinating that this basic func-
tion of the business firm is so completely 
ignored by those who call themselves cor-
porate activists. By the way, as a small 
shareholder in some large firms, I bristle at 
that self-designation. I usually find the ac-
tivities of these people anti-corporate. In 
any event, these activists deserve much of 
the credit or blame for the largest and most 
rapid increase in regulatory controls that 
our nation has ever experienced. In the past 
two decades, we have seen a proliferation 
of government intervention in the private 
sector, dwarfing the actions taken even in 
the 1930s. 
Dr. Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for 
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt 
Distinguished University Professor at Washington 
University in St. Louis. 
A Hard Look at the Effects of Regulation 
However, it is not the sheer number of 
these regulatory activities that should con-
cern us, but rather their impact on the 
ability of the economic system to perform 
its central function. If we look at the 
modern regulatory phenomenon from the 
viewpoint of the average firm, the nature of 
the problem becomes apparent. For each 
box on its organizational chart, there are 
one or more government agencies that are 
counterparts to that box, each of them 
heavily involved in the company's internal 
decision making. The impact is in one pre-
dictable direction: to increase the 
company's overhead and operating costs, 
and to reduce the resources available to 
perform the company's major task of pro-
ducing goods and services for the con-
sumer. To the economist, this is the "oppor-
tunity cost" of government regulation; it 
shows up in what I call the hidden tax of 
regulation-the higher prices that we con-
sumers pay to cover the cost of compliance 
with regulation. 
The basic function of the business firm 
is ignored by those who call themselves 
corporate activists 
I have not yet mentioned the benefits of 
regulation. To the extent that we have 
cleaner air, cleaner water, and so forth, 
these benefits are real. Please note that I 
have chosen my words carefully. The mere 
presence of a government agency does not 
guarantee that its worthy objectives will be 
achieved. The serious question-which I 
will cover in a moment-is whether the 
regulation produces benefits and whether 
they are worth the costs. Society's bottom 
line is not the impact of regulatory actions 
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on the government or on the business sys-
tem, but the effect on the consumer, on the 
citizen. 
Clearly, an important effect of regulation 
is the increase in the price of goods and ser-
vices. However, when we go beyond the dol-
lar signs, more subtle and often far more 
serious burdens emerge. Central among 
these are the effects on research and 
development, productivity, and capital for-
mation-basic functions so often adversely 
affected by regulation. Regulation has 
reduced the flow of innovation, the produc-
tion of new and better products, because so 
many government regulatory agencies have 
the power-which they frequently exer-
cise-to decide whether or not a new pro-
duct will go on the market. 
The justification for this power is that it 
keeps unsafe products off the market. Un-
fortunately, the reality is often different. 
Consider drug regulation by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). If we look at 
mortality data-rather than the rhetoric-
we find that, for decades, the leading cause 
of death in this country has not been can-
cer, but cardiovascular disease-heart at-
tacks and strokes. There is a series of new 
drugs for these illnesses called beta block-
ers. They are in widespread use in the 
The mere presence of a government 
agency will not guarantee that its 
objectives will be achieved 
United Kingdom and other developed na-
tions. The United States, however, has 
lagged in the introduction of these drugs 
because of the antiquated procedures of the 
FDA. According to the research of Professor 
William Wardell at the University of 
Rochester Medical School, one of these beta 
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blockers, practolol, currently in widespread 
use in Western Europe, would save 10,000 
lives a year when introduced in the United 
States. 
Society's bottom line is the effect of 
regulatory actions on the consumer 
Beta blockers are not the only drugs 
whose use has been delayed by the FDA. Dr. 
Wardell has examined the list of drugs ac-
tually approved as safe and effective. In 
case after case, the United States was one 
of the last countries to permit their in-
troduction. We are the twenty-second coun-
try in the case of the anti-inflammatory 
drug fenoprofen, the thirty-ninth country 
for the oral cephalosporin cephalexin, and 
the fortieth country for the anti-tubercular 
antibiotic capreomycin. 
These delays are not surprising, given the 
cardinal rule for bureaucratic survival: Do 
not stick your neck out. If you were an FDA 
reviewer and you were to approve practo-
lol, you would be taking a risk. If anybody 
should suffer any adverse reaction, you 
may well bear the responsibility. On the 
other hand, if you do not approve the drug, 
the potential users are unlikely to com-
plain, since they do not know about it and 
they will soon pass from the scene. As a 
result, you ask for more studies, you delay. 
Delays in drug approvals are not 
surprising, given the cardinal rule for 
bureaucratic survival: 
Don't stick your neck out 
Consider the results bluntly: if 16 people 
are harmed by side-effects of a drug in use, 
that becomes front page news. If 10,000 
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people die prematurely because approval of 
a new drug has been delayed, the public is 
unaware. Do not misunderstand my point: 
it is a plea for balance and for effec-
tiveness, not for the elimination of FDA 
regulation. By the way, this is one example 
among many where the real costs of regula-
tion are not expressed in dollars but in 
terms of lives. 
The sad reality is that government 
intervention often does not work-or it 
works against the interest of the 
consumer 
I do not believe that the issue before us is 
as philosophical as, "Are you for or against 
government intervention?" Rather, it in-
volves a very practical question: "Does this 
specific type of government intervention 
work?" The sad reality is that, so often, it 
does not-or it works against the interest 
of the consumer. This reality has been 
recognized in some areas. Deregulation of 
the airlines has benefited the traveling 
public as well as the airlines and their 
employees. Deregulating trucking will do 
the same. 
But, on the other hand, in the case of en-
vironmental regulation, every economic 
study I have ever seen has shown that there 
is a different way of achieving at least the 
same amount of clean air or clean water at 
a small fraction of the current costs. That 
other way involves working through the 
price system by means of pollution taxes or 
pollution permits or property rights. Econo-
mists are belatedly gaining support for that 
position from some of the more enlightened 
environmentalists. Unfortunately, business 
generally takes an adamantly negative posi-
tion. Perhaps many companies do not want 
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regulation but, once they become regulated, 
they become staunch advocates of the 
status quo-preferring familiar inefficiency 
to unfamiliar but more efficient regulation. 
This leads me to a fundamental point 
overlooked in so many discussions of regu-
lation: we cannot assume that specific 
regulations will necessarily produce any 
consumer benefits at all. Take the example 
of environmental regulation. One of the 
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act was 
written solely to protect the jobs of approx-
imately 10,000 Midwestern mine workers. 
Section 125-euphemistically titled 
"Measures to Prevent Economic Disruption 
or Unemployment" -gives the President the 
power to prohibit major fuel-burning sta-
tionary sources from using any fuel other 
than local or regionally available coal, "to 
prevent or minimize significant local or 
regional economic disruption or unemploy-
ment." Once the Governor of any state has 
obtained the President's consent under Sec-
tion 125, he can even require coal-burning 
utilities to enter into long-term contracts 
(ten years or more) for supplies of local 
coal. The governor of Ohio requested auth-
ority to require the use of local coal in his 
state some four years ago, but his request 
has never been acted upon. Nonetheless, the 
Clean Air Act could potentially be used to 
mandate dirtier air for millions of citizens 
in order to protect less than 10,000 people 
from competiton. 
Government intervention is a very 
powerful but extremely imperfect tool. 
We must use it carefully, with full 
awareness of all side effects. 
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Another 1977 amendment to the Clean Air 
Act shows why government regulatory 
statutes rarely conform to the spirit of 
"truth-in-labeling." The BACT (best avail-
able control technology) requirement, which 
applies to all new sources of potentially 
significant pollution, is a cogent case. The 
effect of this provision is to force all new 
coal-fueled power plants to use scrub-
bers-even if the air would be cleaner if 
they did not. How does this ridiculous 
result come about? Simple: the focus in the 
statute is not on achieving clean air. Rather, 
it is on imposing the onerous requirements 
of scrubbing "coal," whether high or low in 
sulphur. The results are ironic: Since util-
ities are required to use the scrubbers any-
way, it is often cheaper to use high-sulphur 
(high polluting) coal because it costs less. It 
is sad to note that the air in many regions 
would be cleaner if the utilities were given 
a choice between (a) cheap and dirty coal 
plus scrubbers, and (b) expensive and 
cleaner coal without scrubbers. The cynical 
explanation is the correct one: the motive in 
this environmental statute is to encourage 
the use of high-sulphur coal. 
The tendency for the regula tory process 
to be used by small groups to extract 
benefits from society as a whole is not a re-
cent phenomenon. Peter Aranson of Emory 
University has brought to my attention the 
following quotation: 
Every new regulation ... presents a 
new harvest to those who watch the 
change, and can trace its consequen-
ces; a harvest, reared not by them-
selves, but by the toils and cares of the 
great body of their fellow citizens. This 
is a state of things in which it may be 
said with some truth that the laws are 
made for the few, not for the many. 
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That quotation is taken from the Federalist 
Papers, No. 62, by James Madison. 
All this demonstrates that government in-
tervention is a very powerful but extremely 
imperfect tool. We must use it carefully, 
with full awareness of all side effects. Cer-
tainly, there are problems in society, and 
some regulatory activities do generate 
benefits. The serious concern is to balance 
the benefits against the costs and side ef-
fects of regulatory actions. The result, we 
must hope, will identify the most efficient 
way of meeting society's goals-and, thus, 
also help to maintain support for them. 
I have never met a mortal man or 
woman who truly represented the 
public interest 
At this point, let me issue a disclaimer. I 
do not claim to represent the public inter-
est. I have spent many years in government, 
helping to make public policy. I have never 
met a mortal man or woman who truly rep-
resented the public interest. Good govern-
ment policy, if we ever get it, reconciles a 
variety of bona fide, legitimate interests. Is 
clean air a legitimate interest? Of course. Is 
high employment legitimate? Is bringing 
down inflation legitimate? Is producing 
safer products legitimate? The answer to 
each of these questions is yes. They are all 
important interests. However, we need a 
mechanism for balancing them-rather 
than taking the simple-minded approach of 
automatically labeling one set of interests 
"public interests," which are supposedly 
good, and labeling the other set "special or 
business interests," which are presumably 
bad. 
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The Role of Benefit/Cost Analysis 
This important aspect leads me to a sec-
ond point, the role of benefit/cost analysis 
in regulation. Let us remember that bene-
fit/cost analysis has been used for decades 
in examining government spending pro-
grams. It is neither a revolutionary, new 
idea nor an invention of the far right. It has 
been attacked by both ends of the political 
spectrum-by the far left because not every 
proposal for government intervention 
passes a benefit/cost test, and by the far 
right, who oppose it because benefit/cost 
analysis can be used to justify government 
intervention. No analytical approach is 
totally value free, but I suggest that 
benefit/cost analysis has less ideological 
baggage than most alternatives. 
The simple-minded approach to 
reconciling legitimate, competing 
concerns is to automatically label one 
set of interests "public interests, II which 
are supposedly good, and label the 
other set "special or business interests, II 
which are presumably bad 
The motive for incorporating such analy-
sis into public-sector decision making is to 
lead to more efficient use of government re-
sources by subjecting the public sector to 
the same type of quantitative constraints as 
those in the private sector. In making an in-
vestment decision, for example, business 
executives compare costs with expected rev-
enues. If the costs exceed the revenues, the 
investment is not considered worthwhile. 
The government decision maker, however, 
does not face the same economic con-
straints. If the costs to society of an agency 
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action exceed the benefits, that situation 
does not usually have an adverse impact on 
the agency. In fact, the administrators may 
not even know about it. The aim of requir-
ing agencies to perform benefit/cost 
analysis is to make the government's deci-
sion making process more effective. It also 
helps to counterbalance the strong attrac-
tion toward regulatory activity on the part 
of government agencies and their sup-
porters, who can crow about the benefits 
and ignore the costs-because the costs are 
transmitted to the consumer not by the 
government but by business. In fact, 
regulatory activists can have some fun 
needling business about price increases 
even when they result from the costs of 
complying with regulation. 
Applying Analysis to Regulation 
Let us analyze benefit-cost analysis. A 
basic relationship of costs and benefits 
tends to hold for many regulatory pro-
grams. Typically, the initial regulatory ef-
fort-such as cleaning up the worst effects 
of pollution in a river-may generate bene-
fits significantly greater than costs. But the 
resources required to achieve additional 
cleanup become disproportionately high. At 
some point the added benefits are substan-
tially less than the added costs. There are 
many examples. A study of environmental 
controls on the fruit and vegetable process-
ing industry shows that it costs less to 
eliminate the first 85 percent of the pollu-
tion than the next 10 percent. 1 
Likewise, the pulp and paper industry 
spent $3 billion complying with federal 
clean-water standards, and achieved a 95 
percent reduction in pollution. But to reach 
98 percent would cost $4.8 billion more, a 
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160 percent increase in costs to achieve a 3 
percent increase in benefits. 2 
Benefit/cost analysis is viewed as a tool 
for identifying the optimum amount of 
regulation. To an economist, "overregula-
tion" is not an emotional term; it is merely 
shorthand for regulation for which the 
costs to the public are greater than the 
benefits. 
"Overregulation" is not an emotional 
term; it is shorthand for regulation for 
which the costs to the public are 
greater than the benefits 
In addition, when there is more than one 
way of attaining a regulatory goal, bene-
fit/cost analysis can compare the various 
methods and help select the most attractive. 
Please note, I did not say that benefit/cost 
analysis will select the least expensive alter-
native. Rather, it will identify the most effi-
cient one in meeting regulatory goals. 
Sometimes the indirect effects of regula-
tion are as important as the direct. Con-
sider the question of mandatory standards 
to ensure the production of less hazardous 
consumer products. From time to time, sug-
gestions have been made to require more 
protection in football helmets. Those using 
the safer helmets would be expected to re-
ceive the benefit from fewer injuries. But in 
practice, the standards might well contrib-
ute to more injuries, since the price 
increases to cover the new regulatory re-
quirements might result in more people 
playing football without any protective 
equipment at all. That example illustrates 
another basic thrust of benefit/cost 
analysis-to examine the proposed govern-
ment action not from the viewpoint of 
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business or government but from the van-
tage point of the consumer. 
When it is not feasible to put a dollar 
sign on the benefits, the analytical ap-
proach still can help by ranking the cost-
effectiveness of alternatives. In essence, the 
analysis estimates the costs of different 
ways to accomplish the same objective. 
Critics who are offended by the notion 
of subjecting a regulation to a 
benefit/cost test must fear that their pet 
rules would flunk the test 
These studies help policymakers to identify 
least-cost solutions. This approach can be 
particularly useful in programs to reduce 
personal hazards. Instead of dealing with 
such an imponderable question as the cost 
of a human life, the emphasis shifts to iden-
tifying the regulatory approach that max-
imizes the number of lives saved from use 
of available resources. 
Uses and Limitations of 
Benefit/Cost Analysis 
Reliable measures of costs and benefits 
are not easily achieved. However, the dif-
ficulties involved need not deter the pursuit 
of analysis. Merely identifying important 
and overlooked impacts can be useful. Ex-
amples on the cost side include the benefi-
cial drugs not available because of regula-
tory obstacles, the freight not carried 
because empty trucks are not permitted to 
carry backhauls, investment in new plants 
not made due to more stringent environ-
mental requirements for new sources, and 
the television and radio stations not broad-
casting because they are not licensed. On 
the benefit side, examples include a more 
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productive work force that results from 
fewer accidents on the job, reduced illness 
because of safer products, and a healthier 
environment resulting from compliance 
with governmental regulations. 
The painful knowledge that resources 
available to safeguard human lives are 
limited causes economists to become 
concerned when they see wasteful use 
of those resources because of regulation 
Critics who are offended by the notion of 
subjecting regulation to a benefit/cost test 
unwittingly expose the weakness of their 
position. They must fear that their pet rules 
would flunk the test. After all, showing that 
a regulatory activity generates an excess of 
benefits is a strong justification for continu-
ing it. Benefit/cost analysis is a neutral con-
cept, giving equal weight to a dollar of 
benefits and to a dollar of costs. The pain-
ful knowledge that resources available to 
safeguard human lives are limited causes 
economists to become concerned when they 
see wasteful use of those resources because 
of regulation. 
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A Personal Note 
I have tried to provide serious, although 
spirited respo11Ses to those who criticize the 
efforts of ec0110mists to examine, a11d to 
quantify, the costs of regulation. I find many 
arguments by certain members of the legal 
profession more in the nature of debaters' 
points rather than serious responses. For ex-
ample, much is made of the point that the 
cost estimates are gross a11d that the benefits 
have not been deducted. This may have a 
plausible ring initially, until we reflect on 
the world around us. When my wife reports 
angrily that the price of bread has risen to 
$1.50 a loaf, do I cavalierly dismiss her con-
cern by telling her she has forgotten to 
deduct the benefits? Implicitly, we assume 
that the value to us of the bread we buy is 
at least $1.50 a loaf. Similarly, I pay a con-
siderable amount of taxes to the govern-
ment. I hope that the benefits justify those 
payments. But I know of no taxpayer who 
refers to his or her tax burden on an after-
benefit basis. I see no reason to ignore or 
minimize the information on the costs im-
posed by government on the public. Indeed, 
I find it intriguing that economists can 
write whole books on the benefits of regula-
tion without generating the slightest 
criticism. But try writing a report on the 
costs, and you literally take your profes-
sional life in your hands, although I prefer 
to feel that you are belling the cat. 
A final note of irony concerns the histrion-
ics that I have observed from time to time 
when a lawyer comments on attempts by an 
economist to estimate the hypothetical value 
of human life for purposes of regulatory 
analysis. The irony arises when we consider 
the frequency with which members of the 
legal profession place a very specific value 
on an individual human life. But they do 
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that typically in a courtroom when a 
generous retainer or contingency fee is at 
stake. At least we can come to understand 
the high principle involved. 
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